“We Have Discovered Dozens Of WMD-Related Program Activities And Significant Amounts Of Equipment That Iraq Concealed From The United Nations During The Inspections That Began In Late 2002.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW [Chemical and Biological Weapons] research.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW [Biological Weapons] agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist’s home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).” (David Kay, Statement On The
Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“A line of UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible
limit.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km – well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten
targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles –probably the No Dong — 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited
military equipment.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“With regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.
They have told ISG [Iraq Survey Group] that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
“In Addition To The Discovery Of Extensive Concealment Efforts, We Have Been Faced With A Systematic Sanitization Of Documentary And Computer Evidence In A Wide Range Of Offices, Laboratories, And Companies Suspected Of WMD Work.” (David Kay, Statement On The Interim Progress Report On The Activities Of The Iraq Survey Group, 10/2/03)
